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Regulating Risks After ATA 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
Abstract 
 
  Whitman v. American Trucking Association was one of the most eagerly awaited 
regulatory decisions in many years. But the Court’s understated, steady, lawyerly 
opinion was a bit of an anticlimax, representing a return to normalcy and leaving many 
open questions. The Court was correct to say that the relevant provision of the Clean Air 
Act forbids consideration of cost; it was also correct to refuse to invoke the nondelegation 
doctrine. Importantly, the Court left in place a set of important lower court decisions, 
allowing agencies to consider costs unless Congress expressly concludes otherwise. The 
Court also raised some new questions about the constitutional status of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act. Perhaps most important, the Court has not ruled out 
nonconstitutional challenges to the particulates and ozone standards, or to ambient air 
quality standards generally. In suggesting that some of those challenges should succeed, 
especially against the new ozone regulation, this essay urges that Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion in the case may well be the most influential in the future, because it 
fits most comfortably with other trends in the law of risk regulation, signaling the 
emergence of a kind of “cost-benefit state.” 
 
 
 
  The last two decades have seen recurring conflicts between two strands in 
the law of risk regulation. The first strand, captured in what we might call “1970s 
environmentalism,” places a high premium on immediate responses to evident 
hazards; rejects claims for quantification of likely benefits; and avoids or 
downplays consideration of cost. These tendencies play a role in prominent 
legislation1  and also in the courts.2 The second strand, captured in what we 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago, Law 
School and Department of Political Science. I am grateful to Richard A. Posner and Adrian 
Vermeule for helpful comments on a previous draft. 
1 See, e.g., 42 USC 7409(a), as interpreted in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 121 
S.Ct. 903 (2001). 
2 See Lead Industries Association v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 
F.2d 1 (DC Cir 1976)..  
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might call “the cost-benefit revolution,” urges a highly quantitative approach to 
risk control, based on careful specification of both costs and benefits, and on 
close attention to relevant tradeoffs, including the risks sometimes introduced by 
regulation. These tendencies can be seen in prominent executive orders,3 in 
legislation,4 and in courts as well.5  
 
Some of the most noteworthy conflicts between the two strands have 
involved efforts by courts to authorize agencies to make cost-benefit 
comparisons under statutes not explicitly calling for those comparisons.6 Recent 
presidents and courts have gone so far as to create a series of “cost-benefit 
default rules,” allowing agencies to disregard trivial risks, requiring agencies to 
show significant benefits from regulation, allowing agencies to consider the 
substitute risks introduced by regulation, and authorizing agencies to take costs 
into account when statutes are not explicit on the point.7 
 
Within the judiciary, the recent conflicts have pressed two questions in 
particular: When must agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), consider costs?8 When, if ever, will Congress be required to legislate with 
particularity?9 The latter question has not often thought to be especially 
interesting, because courts have not invoked the nondelegation doctrine to 
invalidate a federal statute since 1935.10 But a number of commentators have 
suggested that it is past time to revive the doctrine, partly in order to ensure 
legislative attention to tradeoffs rather than pleasant homilies.11 And in the last 
decade or so, some courts, concerned about the grant of open-ended discretion to 
the executive, have shown an unmistakable interest in doing exactly that.12 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Executive Order 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1980); Executive Order 12498, 50 Fed. Reg. 
1036 (1985); Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1993). 
4 See, e.g., 42 USC 300f et seq. (Safe Drinking Water Act). 
5 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991). 
6 See State of Michigan v. EPA, 213 F3d 663, 678-79 (DC Cir 2000). 
7 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Rules, Mich :L Rev (forthcoming 2001). 
8 See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1154-1166 (DC Cir 1987); George Warren Corp. V. EPA 
159 F3d 616, 623-24 (DC Cir 1998). 
9 See, e.g., National Lime Association v. EPA, 233 F3d 625 (DC Cir 2000). 
10 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 US 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. US, 295 US 495 
(1935). 
11 See David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility (1992); John Hart Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust (1981). 
12 See American Trucking Assn. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999), reversed in part sub nom. 
Whitman v. EPA, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001); International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (DC 
Cir 1991); South Dakota v. Department of Interior, 69 F.2d 878 (8th Cir 1995); Massieu v. Reno, 915 
F Supp 681 (DNY 1996).  
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Because it promised to help answer both of these two questions, Whitman 
v. American Trucking Association13 was the most eagerly anticipated case in 
administrative law in many years. In some circles, a dramatic decision was 
anticipated, raising the possibility of significant new directions in the law of 
environmental protection and risk regulation. On the central issues, however, the 
Court’s unanimous, steady, lawyerly opinion amounted to a return to normalcy 
– and to an understated but unmistakable rebuke to some attempted innovations 
on the part of the court of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In its 
principal ruling, the Supreme Court reaffirmed long-settled law to the effect that 
in setting national ambient air quality standards, the EPA is not permitted to 
consider costs.14 The Court also rejected a constitutional attack on the Clean Air 
Act, reestablishing long-settled law allowing Congress to delegate broad 
discretionary authority to regulatory agencies.15 And through this return to 
normalcy, the current Court treated the court of appeals for the District of 
Columbia in the same way that the 1970s Supreme Court treated that very court 
of appeals – attacking new judicial innovations and calling for at least a form of 
“hands off.”16 
 
The Court ruled quite broadly on both of the key issues, but it also 
reasoned in an extremely unambitious way, saying invoking statutory language 
and precedent while saying little about the topic of risk regulation and offering 
astonishingly little in the way of theoretical ground for its reluctance to invoke 
the nondelegation doctrine. We know that the Court is not much interested in 
reviving that doctrine; but we do not know why it lacks that interest.  If we 
consider the importance of the case, the opinion seems a bit of an anticlimax, 
potentially even a judicial return to 1970s environmentalism. But two more 
interesting sets of issues lie beneath the dry surface. The first involves the state of 
the nondelegation doctrine. To be sure, the Court has signaled its lack of 
enthusiasm for the doctrine – indeed, it has given its clearest signal yet on that 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
13 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001). 
14 For the initial part of the long settlement, see Lead Industries Association v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 
(DC Cir 1980). 
15 See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991). 
16 The leading case here is Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 US 519 (1978). See 
Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee, The Supreme Court, and the DC Circuit, 1978 Supreme Court 
Review 345. Professor Scalia’s general (not unqualified) approval of the Supreme Court’s 
rejection of policy initiatives by the D.C. Circuit finds a kind of echo in his majority opinion in 
ATA.  
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point. At the same time, the Court’s rejection of the approach of the court of 
appeals produces new questions about the nondelegation doctrine in some 
important domains of risk regulation, above all involving the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act (OSHA). As we shall see, ATA raises anew a serious 
constitutional question about a key provision of OSHA. 
 
The second, and more pressing, set of issues stems from the Court’s 
remarkably thin and unhelpful discussion of the meaning of the Clean  Air Act 
(CAA). As we shall see, the same concerns that led the court of appeals to invoke 
the nondelegation doctrine might well reemerge on remand in ATA—and in 
many other contexts involving risk regulation. Above all, the court of appeals 
sought to require the EPA to attempt to quantify the risks that it was seeking to 
control, so as to ensure that the agency was attacking large problems rather than 
small ones.17 After ATA, this goal might be achieved through other, more modest 
routes, not involving the Constitution at all. While the ATA Court spoke largely 
in the terms of 1970s environmentalism, it did so in the context of an Article I 
challenge and a highly adventurous effort to inject cost considerations into an 
apparently cost-blind statutory provision. As I will urge, the decision should not 
be seen as an attack on more modest judicial innovations, nonconstitutional in 
nature, that attempt to increase the sense and rationality of risk regulation. 
 
In this Article, I suggest reasons to approve of the principal holdings in 
ATA, arguing that the Court properly interpreted the key statutory provisions 
and also that it was correct not to invoke the nondelegation doctrine in the case. 
In a period in which the Court is often criticized for allowing its own political 
convictions to overwhelm its duty of fidelity to the law, the quiet, lawyer-like 
analysis in ATA warrants considerable enthusiasm. I also argue on behalf of a 
large role, even after ATA, for the cost-benefit default principles, suggesting that 
they deserve a continuing place in the lower courts. In the process, I investigate 
one of the most interesting features of ATA: the sharply conflicting approaches of 
the Court’s two specialists in administrative law. Justice Scalia’s  opinion for the 
Court is lawyerly, formalistic, textualist, and apparently indifferent to the topic 
of consequences. Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion is highly pragmatic, going 
well beyond the legal materials to try to make sense of the regulatory regime that 
Congress created. With respect to the law of risk regulation, I believe that Justice 
Breyer’s opinion, an unambiguous rejection of 1970s environmentalism, is the 
harbinger of the future, and potentially the most important opinion in the case. 
Invoking Justice Breyer’s concerns, I suggest that a number of challenges remain 
                                                 
17 See American Trucking Assn. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999).  
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available to national ambient air quality standards – and that the most plausible 
of these challenges, connected directly with Justice Breyer’s opinion, promise to 
increase the sense and rationality of national environmental policy. 
 
This Article comes in four parts. Part I describes the background. Part II 
discusses the Court’s opinion and offers an evaluation. Part III briefly explores 
the three concurring opinions in the case, with particular reference to Justice 
Breyer’s emphasis on recurring issues in risk regulation. Part IV discusses the 
future. I pay special attention here to the problems not resolved in ATA, 
including the place of cost-benefit default principles, constitutional status of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), and the possibility of 
nonconstitutional challenges to the EPA’s particulates and ozone regulations, 
and indeed ambient air quality regulations in general.  
 
I. The  Setting 
 
To understand ATA, it is necessary to know something about what 
happened in the EPA and the court of appeals. For many years, the EPA had 
refused to issue a new national standard for particulates, notwithstanding 
scientific evidence apparently indicating grounds for action. Eventually the EPA 
was spurred to act by a decision of a district court, with an exceedingly  rapid 
timetable for action.18  
 
So spurred, the EPA issued a new standard for small particulates in 199719; at 
the same time, the EPA issued a standard for ozone. In both cases, the scientific 
issues are extremely complex, and reasonable people might well argue about 
whether the evidence adequately supported the EPA’s decisions. But a general 
reading of the evidence suggests an important distinction, one that is relevant 
both to ATA and to the future of risk regulation. Under the EPA’s own data, the 
particulates standard promises significant health gains, both in terms of 
mortalities averted and in terms of morbidity.20 Consider the following table: 
                                                 
18 See  American Lung Association v. Browner, 884 F. Supp. 345  (D. Ariz. 1994). 
19 62 Fed. Reg 38,652 (1997). 
20 The clearest evidence comes from U.S. EPA Innovative Strategies & Economics Group, Office of 
Air Quality Planning and Standards, Regulatory Impact Analyses for the Particulate Matter and 
Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (1997). For an overview, see appendix to Cass R. 
Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich L Rev 303, 384-94 (1999).  
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Table 1 
Particulates Standard 
National Annual Health Incidence Reductions 
ENDPOINT    Partial Attainment Scenario 
  Annual PM2.5   50 
  Daily PM2.5    150 
1. Mortality: short-term exposure 
                        long-term exposure 
360 
340 
2. Chronic Bronchitis  6,800 
Hospital Admissions: 
3. all respiratory (all ages) 
all resp. (ages 65+) 
pneumonia (ages 65+) 
COPD (ages 65+) 
4. Congestive heart failure  
5. Ischemic heart disease 
 
190 
470 
170 
140 
130 
140 
6. Acute Bronchitis  1,100 
7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms  
8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms 
shortness of breath 
asthma attacks 
10,400 
5,300 
18,300 
8,800 
9. Work Loss Days  106,000 
10. Minor Restricted Activity Days (MRADs)  879,000 
 
But EPA data suggest a much more mixed picture for ground-level ozone. 
The evidence is more mixed for two reasons. First, the mortality and health gains 
from the new standard appear much more modest; it is possible that the ozone 
standard would save no additional lives per year. Indeed, tighter regulation of 
particulates, going well beyond the EPA’s rule, would appear to do a great deal 
more to protect health than would the new regulation of ozone. Consider the 
following table:  
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Table 2  Ozone Standard 
 
ENDPOINT 
  0.08 4th Max 
Low- to High-end Est. 
Ozone Health: 
1. Mortality 
 
0 – 80 
Hospital Admissions 
2. all respiratory (all ages) 
all respiratory (ages 65+) 
pneumonia (ages 65+) 
COPD (ages 65+) 
emer. dept. visits for asthma 
 
300 – 300 
2,330 – 2,330 
870 – 870 
260 – 260 
130 – 130 
3. Acute Respiratory Symptoms 
(any of 19) 
asthma attacks 
MRADs 
29,840 – 29,840 
 
60 – 60 
650 – 650 
4. Mortality from air toxics  1 – 1 
Ancillary PM Health: 
1. Mortality: short-term exp. 
long-term exposure 
 
0 – 80 
0 – 250 
2. Chronic Bronchitis  0 – 530 
Hospital Admissions: 
3. all respiratory (all ages) 
all resp. (ages 65+) 
pneumonia (ages 65+) 
COPD (ages 65+) 
4. congestive heart failure 
5. ischemic heart disease 
 
0 – 90 
0 – 60 
0 – 20 
0 – 20 
0 – 20 
0 – 20 
6. Acute Bronchitis  0 – 400 
7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms 
8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms 
shortness of breath 
asthma attacks 
0 – 4,670 
0 – 430 
0 – 1,220 
0 – 5,510 
9. Work Loss Days  0 – 50,440 
10. Minor Restricted Activity Days (MRADs)  0 – 420,300 
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Second, the evidence for ozone is more mixed because ground-level ozone 
provides protection against cataracts and skin cancer.21 To be sure, cataracts and 
skin cancer are not the most serious of health problems, especially in light of the 
very high cure rate for skin cancer. But if the protective effects are taken into 
account, it is not entirely clear that the new regulation of ozone will actually 
produce a net improvement in terms of health. 
 
The relevant provision of the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set primary 
standards  “the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are requisite to protect 
the public health,” with “an adequate margin of safety.”22 The American 
Trucking Association and others launched a variety of challenges to the 
particulates and ozone standards. Of these challenges, among the most 
interesting was based on the evidence just described -- a claim that the EPA was 
obliged  to take into account the health benefits, and not merely the health risks, 
of ground-level ozone. The court accepted this objection, concluding that the 
EPA had consider all “identifiable effects” of ozone, both positive and negative.23  
The government did not appeal this important aspect of the decision, whose 
implications for future EPA action remain unclear, in part because of the EPA’s 
unenthusiastic response to the ruling.24  
 
But the two major rulings of the court of appeals involved even larger 
issues. In the court’s view, the statute simply did not allow the agency to 
consider costs, and hence a cost-blind approach to statutory standard was not 
merely permissible but required.25 In this way the court rejected American 
Trucking Association’s imaginative effort to produce a large-scale departure 
from the longstanding understanding that national ambient air quality standards 
would be set without regard to costs. But construed as  a “benefits only” 
provision, the court thought that the relevant provision of the CAA raised 
extremely serious constitutional problems under the nondelegation doctrine, 
which grows out of the constitutional vesting of “all legislative power” in “a 
Congress of the United States.”26 The reason for the constitutional difficulty was 
                                                 
21 See Randall Lutter and C. Wolz, UV-B Screening by Tropospheric Ozone: Implications for the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard, 31 Env. Science & Tech. 142A (1997); Randall Lutter and 
Howard Gruenspecht, Assessing Benefits of Ground-Level Ozone: What Role for Science in 
Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards (unpublished manuscript 2001). 
22 42 USC 7409(b)(1). 
23 American Trucking Assns. V. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999). 
24 For an overview, see Lutter and Gruenspecht, supra note. 
25 See id. for an outline and for critical discussion.  
26 United States Constitution, Article 1, section 1.  
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simple: The relevant provision, as interpreted by EPA, seemed to allow the 
agency to choose whatever standard it liked best. “The agency rightly recognizes 
that the question is one of degree, but offers no intelligible principle by which to 
identify a stopping point.”27 In the court’s view, “EPA’s formulation of its policy 
judgment leaves it free to pick any point between zero and a hair below the 
concentrations yielding London’s Killer Fog.”28  The Constitution could not be 
satisfied without some clearer principle distinguishing permitted from 
prohibited regulation. Rather than invalidating the statute, however, the court 
allowed EPA to cure the difficulty. In the court’s view, it remained possible that 
the EPA could construe the statute in a way that would remove the constitutional 
doubts.29 Such a narrowing construction would be both necessary and sufficient 
for validity. 
 
  But what, specifically, did the court have in mind? The question is 
important both for understanding the Supreme Court’s decision in ATA and for 
understanding the future of national standards after ATA. Clearly the court of 
appeals sought a high degree of quantification – indeed a high enough degree of 
quantification to allow the EPA to explain, with some precision, why one 
standard would be “requisite” to protect the public health, while other standards 
would not be. In this way, the court signaled  its interest in moving well beyond 
1970s environmentalism, toward an approach that would rely on numbers rather 
than general concern and overall impressions. Above all, the court sought a 
specification of the kinds of numbers – in terms of likely adverse health effects 
under the existing standard -- that would call for increased regulation, and the 
kinds of numbers that the EPA would consider tolerable, and hence would not 
call for increased regulation. In the key passage, the court wrote: “On the issue of 
likelihood, for some purposes it might be appropriate to use standards drawn 
from other areas of the law, such as the familiar ‘more probable than not’ 
criterion. Of course a one-size-fits-all criterion of probability would make little 
sense. . . . Nonetheless, an agency wielding the power over American life 
possessed by the EPA should be capable of developing the rough equivalent of a 
generic unit of harm that takes into account population affected, severity, and 
probability. . . .”30  
 
                                                 
27 I75 F. 3d at 1036. 
28 Id. at 1037. 
29 Id. at 1039. 
30 Id.   
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What the court apparently sought was some sort of general measure of 
adverse effects, one that would give an explanation of why, in any given case, 
the agency regulated to one “point” rather than another. The agency might, for 
example, value a statistical death at “100,” treat a case of chronic bronchitis as 
some fraction of that, and do the same for every other adverse health effect. The 
universe of harms from exposure might well be aggregated  in this way – so that 
the gains from the chosen level of regulation would be X, whereas the gains from 
less stringent regulation would be 80% of X, and the gains from more stringent 
regulation would be 120% of X. With quantification of this sort, it would be 
possible to know why the agency chose one point rather than another for 
particulates and ozone, and also to ensure that the agency’s particular choices 
squared, more or less well, with its particular choices for other pollutants. The 
result would be to ensure cross-pollutant coherence, and also to provide some 
coherent explanation, in specific cases, of why industry is wrong to urge less 
stringent controls, and why environmentalists are wrong to request more 
stringent controls. 
 
Perhaps the court suggested this “generic unit of harm” approach partly 
because of the odd fact that the particulates and ozone regulations were before it 
in the same case – and because it seemed hard to understand why EPA did not 
regulate particulates more stringently, and ozone less so. Of course there are 
many complexities in doing what the court of appeals sought. To give just one 
illustration, it is not clear if the agency should focus on the probability of harm 
faced by each individual, or instead on some statistical measure of aggregate 
harms, faced by the population as a whole.31 But the EPA does have sufficient 
information to produce some sort of overall measure of harm, in a way that 
would satisfy the court’s concerns.32 A key question is whether the Constitution, 
or some other source of law, requires the EPA to be so quantitative, as a way of 
explaining why it chooses one degree of regulation rather than another, either 
more or less stringent. 
 
  The government promptly appealed, objecting above all to the 
nondelegation ruling. In a bit of a surprise, the respondents cross-petitioned, 
arguing that the Act should be construed to allow the EPA to consider costs in 
setting ambient standards. The cross-petition was analytically prior, and this was 
the question that the Supreme Court addressed first. 
                                                 
31 For a plea for looking at the size of the affected population, see James Hamilton and W. Kip 
Viscusi, Calculating Risks (1999). 
32 See Sunstein, supra note, for an overview, with reference to ozone and particulates.  
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II. Lawyer’s  Fare 
 
Let us now turn to the Court’s rulings on the two key issues in the case.33 
 
A.  Costs? No Elephants in Mouseholes 
 
The first question was whether national ambient air quality standards 
should be based on an assessment of benefits alone, or instead on some kind of 
balancing of benefits and costs. Recall that the relevant provision of the CAA 
requires the EPA to set primary standards  “the attainment and maintenance of 
which . . . are requisite to protect the public health,” with “an adequate margin of 
safety.” At first glance, the statute appears to be indifferent to cost. All that 
matters is that pollution be controlled so as “to protect the public health.” This 
view of the provision is strengthened by the fact that national standards are 
supposed to be based on a “criteria” document, which is required, in turn, to 
discuss all “identifiable effects” of the pollutant on public health and welfare.34 
The criteria document is not required to discuss the economic effects of 
regulation itself. Thus the analysis seemed simple: If the ambient standard is 
required “to protect the public health” and to be “based” on the criteria 
document, and if that document is not supposed to discuss costs, then it would 
seem to follow that standard-setting may not be done with reference to costs. 
 
In essence, the Court accepted this analysis. Proceeding in textualist 
manner, with an emphasis on statutory language and structure (but no reference 
to the legislative history), it held that standard-setting must indeed be cost-
blind.35 The Court said that the key statutory term, “public health,” requires an 
analysis of the effects of the pollutant, and that costs are irrelevant. But the 
American Trucking Association and its allies pressed some good questions from 
common sense: Can the EPA possibly issue national standards on the basis of an 
inquiry into public health only?  If the costs of compliance are extremely high, 
won’t the EPA inevitably impose more lenient regulations than it would if the 
costs are extremely low? Isn’t it obviously worthwhile to achieve some small 
improvement in air quality, if the costs of compliance are (say) $500,000, and 
obviously less worthwhile to do so if the costs of compliance are (say) $10 
billion? These questions seem especially powerful in light of the fact, 
                                                 
33 I do not discuss the third ruling, involving the relationship between the new ozone rule and 
statutory provisions governing ozone. This third ruling has considerable practical importance, 
but it does not raise recurring issues. 
34 42 USC 7409(b)(1). 
35 121 S. Ct. at 911.  
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acknowledged by EPA, that there is no “safe threshold” for many pollutants, 
including those involving in ATA itself. If there is no safe threshold, a cost-blind 
analysis would seem to require EPA to eliminate pollutants from the ambient air 
– a result that would ban automobiles, coal-fired power plants, and much more. 
Consideration of costs would appear necessary to avert this ludicrous 
conclusion. And the argument seemed to draw further strength from the 
apparent fact, urged by credible observers, that the EPA had in fact considered 
costs, although tacitly and without public supervision.36 
 
In fact it makes most sense to interpret the “requisite to protect the public 
health” language  to require EPA to make a showing of significant risk, a point 
that goes some (not all) of the way toward answering these objections.37 But the 
Supreme Court’s major answer to these points was simple: Tell it to Congress.38  
For the Court, the only real question was whether “public health” could be 
understood to be a reference not only to environmental effects, but also to the 
adverse effects introduced by regulation. Invoking the dictionary39 as its 
principal authority, the Court suggested (not so helpfully) that the ordinary 
meaning “public health” is “the health of the public,” that this is “the most 
natural of readings,” and that the natural reading is inconsistent with the claim 
that costs are relevant to the EPA’s decision.40  
 
To be sure, the cross-petititioners did not rely on policy arguments alone. 
They also urged (and the Court acknowledged, also with the dictionary’s aid) 
that “public health” is a not an unambiguous phrase. In their view, “many more 
factors than air pollution affect public health,” and “a very stringent standard 
might produce health losses sufficient to offset the health gains achieved in 
cleaning the air – for example, by closing down whole industries and thereby 
impoverishing the workers and consumes dependent upon those industries.”41 
There is a great deal of evidence to support this claim. Expensive regulation does 
appear to produce health risks.42  
 
                                                 
36 See Marc Landy et al., The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions 
(1997). 
37 As Justice Breyer emphasized. See below. 
38 Id. 
39 Use of the dictionary has become a common textualist theme. See Note, Looking It Up, 107 
Harv. L. Rev. 1437 (1995); William Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L Rev 621 (1990). 
40 121 S. Ct.. at 908. 
41 I.d at 909. 
42 See Robert Hahn et al. Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality? (2000).  
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The Court did not reject the empirical claim, but it held that arguments of 
this kind could not defeat the “natural” interpretation of the Act. Indeed the 
Court analyzed the statutory structure to give further support to that 
interpretation. Unlike the apparently cost-blind provision governing national 
ambient air quality standards, other provisions of the Clean Air Act explicitly 
permitted cost to be taken into account. For example, a key provision of the Act, 
for example, asks EPA to consider costs in selecting the “best system” for 
emissions reductions from new pollution sources.43 The fact that some statutes 
expressly referred to cost seemed to support the view that the provision at issue 
in ATA, most naturally read as cost-blind, did in fact have this meaning. To this 
the Court added that Congress was “unquestionably aware” of the potentially 
adverse effects of expensive regulation, and hence allowed the EPA to waive the 
compliance deadline for stationary sources upon a showing, inter alia, that “the 
continued operation of such sources is essential . . . to the public health or 
welfare.”44 
 
All this was enough to suggest that the basic provision of the Act banned 
consideration of cost. Because that basic provision is “the engine that drives 
nearly all”45 of the subsequent provisions of the Act, Congress would not lightly 
be taken to have required cost consideration in other provision.46 Congress “does 
not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or 
ancillary provisions – it does not, one might say, hide elephants in 
mouseholes.”47 Hence the statute’s terms “adequate margin” and “requisite” 
should not be taken to allow consideration of cost, because it is “implausible that 
Congress would give to the EPA through these modest words the power to 
determinate whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality 
standards.”48 To be sure, a number of provisions of the Act expressly require the 
EPA to generate information about compliance costs.49 But in the Court’s view, 
these provisions are designed to allow the EPA to assist the states in finding low-
cost strategies for attainment.50 They do not suggest that EPA is allowed to 
                                                 
43 42 USC 7411(b)(1)(B). 
44 121 S. Ct. at 909. 
45 This is a considerable overstatement, to the point of inaccuracy. A number of provisions of the 
CAA are affected by the national ambient air quality standards, but most of the (countless) 
provisions are not affected by national standards. 
46 Id. at 910. 
47 Id. at 910. 
48 Id. at 910. 
49 42 USC 7408(b)(l).; 42 USC 7409(d)(2)(C)(iv). 
50 121 S. Ct. at 911.  
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consider costs on its own. All these considerations converged on a single 
conclusion: Ambient standards must be based on considerations of health, and 
cost simply does not matter. 
 
B. Delegation? 
 
If the EPA’s task is to assess public health alone, is the statute an 
unconstitutional delegation of power? Common sense might suggest that there is 
a serious problem here. The question of what level is “requisite to protect the 
public health” seems unaccompanied by statutory standards. If there are no safe 
thresholds, perhaps EPA could (must?) require some pollutants to be eliminated 
entirely from the ambient air. But even in the absence of safe thresholds, perhaps 
EPA could decide that certain risks are to be treated as residual, ordinary, the 
stuff of everyday life. If the statute does not tell the agency what it must do, 
perhaps its range of discretion is unacceptable. Note in this regard that many 
people do not believe that certain imaginable steps are “requisite” to protect their 
own health: They walk at night in dangerous neighborhoods; they eat peanut 
butter; they fail to exercise; they gain weight; they drive cars; they own large 
dogs. In all of these cases, the risks may well be nontrivial as a statistical matter, 
and perhaps EPA could build on such practices in deciding what level of 
regulation is “requisite.” But without statutory guidance, perhaps the Act gives 
the EPA excessive discretion – the discretion essentially to choose the level of risk 
regulation that it wants, with essentially no legislative guidance.  
 
It is important to say here that a statute requiring cost-benefit balancing 
might, on this line of reasoning, raise similar  nondelegation issues, at least in the 
absence of legislative guidance on how to assess both costs and benefits. Without 
such guidance, is an agency permitted to say that a statistical life is worth $1 
million? $10 million? $50 million? Can an agency discount lives saved in the 
future? By 1%? By 7%? If the statute allows agencies to value statistical lives as 
they choose, there might seem to be an unacceptably high level of discretion. 
Thus a constitutional attack on the “requisite to protect the public health” 
language would doubts about many other provisions, including those that give 
costs a role to play in regulatory choices.51 
 
Troubled by the wide range of discretion apparently enjoyed by the EPA, 
the court of appeals held that the Constitution required the agency to come up 
with clear standards by which to explain why it would exercise its discretion to 
                                                 
51 See Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, supra note, for discussion.  
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regulate to one “point” rather than another. But as a constitutional matter, the 
Supreme Court found the lower court’s approach quite implausible. “In a 
delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has 
delegated legislative power to the agency.”52 Because this is the question, an 
agency cannot “cure” an otherwise unconstitutional delegation of power merely 
by adopting a narrowly construction. “The idea that an agency can cure an 
unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise 
some of that power seems to us internally contradictory.”53 Thus the agency’s 
“voluntary self-denial”54  has no bearing on the real constitutional question, 
which is whether Congress has cabined agency discretion with the requisite 
“intelligible principle.” 
 
Turning to that question, the Court said that the statute required the EPA 
to use the latest scientific knowledge to establish standards “at a level that is 
requisite to protect the public health from the adverse effects of the pollutant in 
the ambient air.” The statutory idea of ‘requisite-to-protect” meant “sufficient, 
but not more that necessary,” to provide that protection.55 In the Court’s view, 
this standard was constitutionally acceptable, because it was “strikingly similar” 
to limitations found acceptable in other cases.  The Court had, for example, 
upheld a grant of authority to the Attorney General to designate a drug as a 
controlled substance if this step was “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to 
the public health.”56 The Occupational Safety and Health Act contained a quite 
similar provision, which was also found constitutionally valid.57 The Court 
acknowledged that “the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies 
according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.”58 Hence 
Congress “must provide substantial guidance on setting air standards that affect 
the entire national economy.”59 But it was nonetheless unnecessary for Congress 
to provide a “determinate criterion” to establish how much regulation is too 
much. To be sure, the EPA would be making “judgments of degree.”  The 
decision about what is “requisite” would not run afoul of the nondelegation 
principle. 
 
                                                 
52 121 S Ct at 912. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 912. 
56 Touhy v. United States, 500 S 160 (1991). 
57 Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. API (The Benzene Case), 448 US 607 (1980). 
58 121 S. Ct. at 913. 
59 Id.  
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C.  Evaluation: Two and A Half Cheers 
 
On both of the key issues, the Court’s unanimity should not be surprising. 
Indeed, the Court’s fidelity to preexisting law -- even its steady, unimaginative, 
lawyerly opinion -- gives reason for some confidence in a Court that has been 
much criticized for allowing its own political convictions to play an excessive 
role in its interpretation of the law. It is far from unreasonable to speculate that 
some of the justices lacked much enthusiasm, on political grounds, for a cost-
blind Clean Air Act, and that some of them would like Congress to give 
narrower delegations of authority to regulatory agencies. Nonetheless, the Court 
took the existing legal materials, in the form of statutory language and judicial 
precedents, extremely seriously. The Court was right to say that those materials 
required both results. The best interpretation of the CAA does not allow the EPA 
to consider costs when setting national standards. Moreover, there is no good 
argument for a large-scale revival of the nondelegation doctrine; and if the 
doctrine is to be used in the most extreme cases, ATA was not such a case. 
 
1. Cost. To say this is not to deny that the case had its complexities, or to 
urge that it would be impossible to imagine an opinion coming out the other way 
on either issue. At a minimum, the Court might plausibly have said that in 
deciding what margin of safety is “adequate,” the EPA is permitted to take 
account of costs, not merely benefits. In addition, the phrase “requisite to protect 
the public health” is not altogether transparent. Especially in view of the fact that 
expensive regulations can have harmful effects on public health – a fact of which 
Congress was aware – it could be urged that whether a particular regulation 
qualifies, under that phrase, as “requisite” is a function of cost, not merely 
benefit. A reasonable court might well be drawn to this interpretation, at least if 
it were seen as the only way of making sense, rather than nonsense, of the statute 
as a whole. Such an opinion would not have been beyond the pale. 
 
Nor would this approach entirely lack precedential support. In the 
Benzene Case,60 the Court interpreted the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 
a way that would ensure against regulatory absolutism – not by requiring cost-
benefit balancing, but by saying, without textual support, that the agency could 
not regulate a risk not shown to be “significant.” In dissent, Justice Marshall, 
sounding very much like Justice Scalia in ATA, contended that conventional legal 
tools could not justify imposing a “significant risk” requirement, which, in 
                                                 
60 Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, v. API, 448 US 607 (1980).  
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Justice Marshall’s view, was a judicial fabrication.61  In defending its conclusion, 
and its somewhat irreverent approach to the statutory text, the Benzene plurality 
emphasized that the government’s approach “would give OSHA power to 
impose enormous costs that might produce, little, if any, discernible benefit.”62 It 
would not have been a gigantic  stretch from this line of reasoning to a holding, 
in  ATA, that the EPA should be permitted to consider whether an enormous 
outlay of expenditures can be justified by the benefits received. In any case a 
number of lower court decisions have not stayed close to the statutory text where 
common sense seemed to require a measure of regulatory flexibility.63 
 
Nonetheless, the path that the Court chose was unquestionably the easier 
one, because it fit so much more naturally with the statutory language. To this 
we might add three further points. First, the pressure on the Court was greatly 
relieved by the fact that in the implementation process, costs could indeed be 
considered, and at multiple stages. This point sharply distinguished the CAA 
from OSHA, which lacks any comparable implementation stage.64 If Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in ATA is close to Justice Marshall’s dissenting one in 
the Benzene Case, it might be partly because the consequences of a cost-blind 
approach to standard-setting are not quite what they seem – as Justice Scalia  was 
undoubtedly aware. Second, the “requisite to protect the public health” language 
might well be regarded as imposing a significant risk requirement. The Court 
said little on this issue, a gap to which I will turn in due course; but even on the 
Court’s view, the CAA does not require the EPA to remove all risks, regardless 
of their magnitude. For this reason the EPA’s position in ATA was far more 
cautious, and modest, than OSHA’s more draconian position in the Benzene 
Case. Third, textualism might be regarded as a kind of “penalty default,” 
imposing a burden on Congress, and on relevant interest groups, to provide a 
corrective for any problems introduced by a cost-blind approach. There is room 
for reasonable debate about whether Congress is sufficiently responsive to 
penalty defaults of this kind. But some comfort can come from the fact that a 
legislative corrective  is certainly possible, and has in fact been provided in a 
somewhat analogous context.65 
                                                 
61 Id at 640 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
62 Id. at 620. 
63 See, eg., State of Michigan v. EPA, supra. 
64 This is because the CAA requires states to produce implementation plans to bring about 
compliance with federal standards, whereas OSHA regulations are directly binding on the 
private sector. 
65 See 21 USC 376(b)((5)(B) (the Delaney Clause), as discussed in Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F2d 
1108 (DC Cir 1987). In 1996, Congress amended the Delaney Clause in various ways, softening its  
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2. Delegation. On the nondelegation issue, the Court’s opinion is much less 
satisfying.  The Court appears to have delivered a death blow to those who have 
sought to revive the nondelegation doctrine. Why, exactly, did the Court do this? 
The Court’s opinion is quite wooden on the point, attempting only to show that 
the delegation in the CAA was no different from those delegations found 
acceptable in many other cases. This was an example of dullest and the most 
unambitious form of analogical reasoning – the sort of thing recently associated 
with Chief Justice Rehnquist, or even former Chief Justice Burger, and very 
different from what usually emerges from the Justice Scalia’s pen.  
 
Most strikingly, the Court made no effort to explain exactly why it was so 
willing to allow Congress to grant considerable discretionary authority to the 
EPA. Nor did the Court explain why it was uninterested in reviving the 
nondelegation doctrine in general. With respect to analogies, the Court basically 
skimmed the surface, arguing, plausibly if not entirely convincingly, that the 
delegation here was not evidently greater than the delegation in other cases. The 
Court offered exceedingly little in the way of detail. It would not have been 
terribly hard to distinguish those cases. The EPA, for example, is authorized to 
cover a much larger portion of the American economy than was involved in the 
precedents, and it would be at least plausible to say that its discretion was 
broader as well. To know whether this latter argument is convincing, it would be 
necessary to say much more about the meaning of the relevant provision of the 
Clean Air Act. But here the Court’s efforts were thin to the point of being 
comical. The repetition of statutory terms – “requisite to protect the public 
health” – was not much aided by the Court’s (repeated) explanation that these 
terms meant “no less, but also no more” than necessary to protect the health of 
the public. 
 
We might say that with respect to the nondelegation doctrine, the Court’s 
opinion is remarkably shallow, in the sense that it lacks any theoretical ambition, 
but also remarkably wide, in the sense that it appears to dispose of a wide range 
of imaginable  nondelegation challenges.66  The Court has made it clear that the 
nondelegation doctrine will be used, if at all, only in the most extreme cases. But 
                                                                                                                                                 
absolutist character. See 21 USC 321 (d), by replacing the flat ban with a requirement of a 
“reasonable certainty of no harm,” defined in the legislative history to reflect a policy of reducing 
cancer risks in the exposed population to no more than 1-in-1-million additional lifetime risk. For 
discussion, see Robert Percival et al., Environmental Regulation 496 (3d ed. 2001). 
66 On shallowness/depth and narrowness/breadth, see Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time 
(199).  
19   
it has given little indication of why it is taking this approach. Is it possible to say 
what lies beneath the surface here? 
 
Some clues come from Justice Scalia’s separate writing on the topic.67 
Justice Scalia has objected to the nondelegation doctrine on the ground, not that 
it lacks constitutional roots, but that it is not subject to principled judicial 
enforcement. The line between permissible and prohibited delegations is 
inevitably one of degree: How much discretion is too much discretion? Judicial 
efforts to answer that question are not susceptible to rule-bound judgments, and 
hence particular rulings would inevitably have the appearance, and perhaps the 
reality, of judicial partisanship. In these circumstances a judicially enforcement 
nondelegation doctrine might even be said to violate that very doctrine’s 
aspiration to rule-bound law. A judge who aspires to reduce judicial discretion 
will inevitably be skeptical about the nondelegation doctrine. 
 
I believe that these concerns help explain the Court’s surface-skimming in 
ATA—and also that the concerns are well-founded. These institutional problems 
are best combined with a point about the nature of the regulatory state. There is 
no good evidence that a revival of the nondelegation doctrine would make 
constitutional government work better, from any point of view. In this light the 
case for reviving the doctrine seems weak indeed.68 Indeed, the purposes 
underlying the doctrine can better be achieved through other routes, including 
substantive reform, the hard look doctrine, and narrowly targeted “nondele-
gation canons.”69 
 
But all this leaves a nagging question: What does the Act mean? Here the 
Court’s answer is embarrassingly thin. The respondents urged that the statutory 
standard – “requisite to protect the public health” – could mean anything at all. 
To respond to their complaint, it would be necessary to explain how the standard 
creates ceilings and floors on agency action. I will return to the question in Part 
IV. 
 
                                                 
67 See Mistretta v. US, 488 US 361, 375 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).. 
68 See Cass R. Sunstein, supra note. 
69 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, in Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do 
(forthcoming 2001).  
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III.  Fundamentalism, Semantics and Pragmatism 
 
ATA produced three separate opinions of considerable interest. Justice 
Thomas’ concurring opinion is noteworthy because of his brief remarks on the 
nondelegation doctrine. Justice Stevens’ far longer concurrence is noteworthy 
because of the “caveat” he seeks to add to the majority’s view. Justice Breyer’s 
opinion is the most important of all, because of its effort to make sense of the 
regulatory scheme, and because of its attempt to provide some guidance for the 
future of risk regulation.  Before exploring the majority opinion, I offer a brief 
outline and several comments here. 
 
A. Fundamentalism 
 
Justice Thomas agreed that the CAA provided “no less an ‘intelligible 
principle’ than a host of other directives that we have approved.”70 But he 
objected that the parties had provided “barely a nod to the text of the 
Constitution,” which does not speak of ‘intelligible principles’”71  I n s t e a d ,  h e  
urged, “it speaks in much simpler terms: All legislative powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress.’” In Justice Thomas’ view, some statutes might 
contain “intelligible principles” but still involve a delegated decision whose 
significance  “is simply too great . . . to be called anything other than 
legislative.”72 For this reason, Justice Thomas indicated his willingness “to 
address the question whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far 
from our Founders’ understanding of separation of powers.”73 
 
At first glance, Justice Thomas’ reasoning seems mysterious. The 
requirement of an “intelligible principle” is many decades old.74 It would be truly 
astonishing if the Court were to abandon the requirement as an understanding of 
the nondelegation principle. In any case the idea that “all legislative power” is 
vested in a Congress is hardly self-interpreting; the question is what this 
provision means. It would even be possible to read the constitutional 
background to suggest that Congress can delegate such legislative power as it 
wishes. If this conclusion is overdrawn—as I believe that it is75—then the 
question becomes when some amount of executive discretion becomes 
                                                 
70 121 S. Ct. at 919. 
71 Id. at 919-920. 
72 Id. at 920. 
73 Id. 
74 See J.W. Hampton, Jr. v. US, 276 US 394, 409 (1928). 
75 See Sunstein, supra note, for discussion.  
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“legislative” in nature. The requirement of an intelligible principle is simply a 
means of answering that question.  
 
But underneath the implausible formalist veneer, Justice Thomas might 
well have a point. His key sentence is this: “I believe that there are cases in which 
the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is 
simply too great for the decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’”76  
Perhaps Justice Thomas is suggesting that an otherwise acceptable delegation 
would be objectionable if the area or context suggested – the “significance”—
indicated that an intelligible principle is not enough. So understood, Justice 
Thomas’ view is not inconsistent with the majority’s suggestion “that the degree 
of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power 
congressionally conferred.” On this view, the nondelegation doctrine is not 
entirely without life. Where an agency is given the power to regulate much of the 
American economy, the statutory principle must be more intelligible than it must 
otherwise be. All statutory principles must be intelligible, but some must be 
more intelligible than others. This is a perfectly reasonable suggestion. 
 
B. Semantics 
 
In an opinion joined by Justice Souter, Justice Stevens urged that the Court 
should admit that agency rulemaking authority counts as “legislative power,” 
but that it is not unconstitutional for that reason.77 If national ambient air quality 
standards had been issued by Congress, “everyone would agree that those rules 
would be the product of an exercise of ‘legislative power.’”78 In Justice Stevens’ 
view, an agency that makes rules, under an acceptable delegation, is also acting 
“legislatively.” For Justice Stevens, the proper way to analyze the case is to 
acknowledge that the agency acted legislatively, but to hold that the exercise of 
legislative power is legitimate, because it was constrained by a sufficiently 
intelligible principle. 
 
This seems to be a purely semantic debate, and nothing at all appears to 
turn on it.  Where the majority would say that legislative power had not been 
delegated, because an intelligible principle could be found, Justice Stevens would 
urge that the delegation of legislative power was acceptable, because an 
intelligible principle could be found. Justice Stevens was apparently writing for 
                                                 
76 121 S. Ct. at 920. 
77 Id. at 920. 
78 Id. at 921.  
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the sake of conceptual clarity. But it is unclear whether his approach counts as an 
improvement on that score. The Constitution vests legislative power in Congress, 
and on the standard view, legislative power cannot be delegated. In any event 
the executive has long had the power to make rules, and there is nothing odd in 
saying that rule-making, if confined by some principle, is an executive function if 
the executive is making rules. True, the same exercise would be legislative if 
Congress were carrying it out, a point that suggests that whether an activity 
counts as “legislative” or “executive” depends, in large part, on whether the 
Congress or the executive is acting. But where is the oddity in that conclusion? 
The Court’s approach seems as sensible as that offered by Justice Stevens. 
 
  A good way to make progress would be to say that words, not excluding 
the word “legislative,” have meanings connected with, and not divorced from, 
the purpose for which they are used. There is nothing odd in saying that 
rulemaking is “executive,” when sufficiently cabined by statutory standards, 
when undertaken by the executive branch – but that the same sorts of decisions, 
if made by Congress, would be “legislative” when done by Congress. It seems to 
me that Justice Stevens has been lead astray by the ordinary language use of 
“legislative.” Even if agency rulemaking is legislative in one, perfectly intelligible 
sense, it is not legislative, in the sense of Article I, section 1, if an executive 
agency has engaged in it. 
 
C. Pragmatism 
 
In its own way, Justice Breyer’s opinion was the most remarkable in the 
case – an intriguing comparison to Justice Scalia’s  majority opinion, indeed an 
opinion that might easily be imagined as a majority opinion of a very different 
sort. Justice Breyer’s separate opinion seemed to have two goals. The first was to 
show that the legislative history of the Act, and not merely its text, strongly 
supported the majority’s conclusion.79 This part of Justice Breyer’s opinion is part 
of a longstanding disagreement between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer,80 and 
raises no novel problems.  
 
Justice Breyer’s second goal was to endorse a principle of interpretation, 
one that would allow agencies to consider costs in the face of statutory silence or 
ambiguity. “In order better to achieve regulatory goals—for example, to allocate 
                                                 
79 Id. at 922. 
80 Compare Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1996) with Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of 
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 So. Cal. L. Rev. 845 (1992).  
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resources so that they save more lives or produce a cleaner environment—
regulators must often take account of all of a proposed regulation’s adverse 
effects, at least where those adverse effects clearly threaten serious and 
disproportionate public harm. Hence, I believe that, other things being equal, we 
should read silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory statutes as 
permitting, not forbidding, this type of rational regulation.”81 The reason that 
EPA could not consider costs here was that other things were not “equal”; the 
statutory structure and history showed “a congressional decision not to delegate 
to the agency the legal authority to consider economic costs of compliance.”82 
This is a centrally important cautionary note, one to which I will return. 
 
Justice Breyer’s third goal was to establish the rationality of the legislative 
scheme as he understood it. He wanted to show that the “natural” construction 
made sense, not nonsense. His overall suggestion was that as construed, the 
statute would, at pertinent phases, allow consideration of costs after all, and that 
the EPA would be permitted to construe the statute reasonably, by making it less 
draconian than it appeared. To this end he offered four points, each of 
considerable interest. 
 
1. As part of its cost-blindness, the statute was designed not to take 
pollution control technology as given but to force technological 
innovation. This was hardly an unrealistic hope.83 In fact the catalytic 
converter was developed as a result of a seemingly draconian statutory 
mandate. And because the statute was expressly designed to force 
technological innovation, regulatory efforts to calculate the costs of 
compliance were “both less important and more difficult”84 -- because the 
relevant calculations would be based on speculation about the cost of 
unknown future technologies. These calculations “can breed time-
consuming and potentially unresolvable agreements about the accuracy 
and significance of cost estimates.”85 In these circumstances, cost-benefit 
analysis might itself fail cost-benefit analysis. 
2.  Even as interpreted by the Court, the Act allows cost and feasibility to be 
considered.86 These factors are relevant, for example, to states deciding on 
the mix of control devices used to achieve compliance; and those facing 
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economic hardship can seek an exemption from state requirements. The 
EPA is also permitted to consider costs, not in setting standards, but in 
setting deadlines for attainment.  Congress is also available to extend 
deadlines if necessary.87 The relevant provision of the CAA might be cost-
blind; but this is not at all true for the statute as a whole. 
3.  The EPA is not required to “eliminate every health risk, however slight, 
at any economic cost, however great.” Standards “requisite to protect the 
public health” need not produce “a world that is free of all risk—an 
impossible and undesirable objective.”88 In fact the terms “requisite” and 
“ p u b l i c  h ea l th ”  s h ou l d  b e u n d ers tood  i n  c on text.  It i s  rel eva n t f or th e 
EPA to consider “the public’s ordinary tolerance of the particular health 
risk in the particular context at issue.” Hence EPA is allowed to produce a 
kind of common law of “acceptable” risks, rather than eliminating all 
risks as such. In deciding what is “requisite to protect the public health,” 
the EPA is allowed “to consider the severity of a pollutant’s adverse 
health effects, the number of those likely to be affected, the distribution of 
the adverse effects, and the uncertainties surrounding each estimate.”89 
On this count, Justice Breyer is saying more cautious than, but something 
not terribly far from, what was said by the court of appeals. In his own 
way, Justice Breyer was urging the EPA to develop standards for 
separating acceptable from unacceptable risks. 
4.  The EPA is allowed to “consider whether a proposed rule promotes 
safety overall.”90 If a rule causes “more harm to health than it prevents,” 
it is unlawful.91 In this wage Justice Breyer endorsed the lower court’s 
conclusion that the EPA is required to consider the health benefits of 
ground-level ozone, not just the health risks. 
 
What is most important about Justice Breyer’s opinion is the effort not 
merely to read the statutory terms, but also to make sense out of them – to show 
that the statutory framework is not as silly, or absurd, as it might seem to be in 
the abstract. There is a noteworthy contrast here between Justice Scalia’s 
approach, for the majority, and the approach favored by Justice Breyer.92 And 
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because it pays such attention to the pragmatic issues, Justice Breyer’s opinion 
might well prove to be the more important for the future. Each of the four points 
just mentioned has significant implications for EPA decisions and indeed for 
regulation more generally, as we shall shortly see. 
 
III.  Implications—and the Future 
 
ATA leaves many issues open. For the future, the three crucial questions 
involve (a) the place of the “cost-benefit default principles,” which have played a 
large role in the last two decades of federal administrative law; (b) the status of 
the nondelegation doctrine; and (c) the legal standards governing ambient air 
quality standards, including the very standards involved in ATA. I discuss these 
issues in sequence. 
 
A. Cost-Benefit Default Principles 
 
The Court was well-aware that a number of lower court decisions have 
established a new interpretive principle: Where statutes are ambiguous, agencies 
are allowed to consider costs.93 What is the status of this principle, after ATA? 
While things are not entirely clear, the best answer is that the principle is 
unaffected. In fact Justice Breyer went out of his way to endorse the basic idea.94 
Justice Breyer was careful to say that courts “should read silences or ambiguities 
in the language of regulatory statutes” to permit consideration of “all of a 
proposed regulation’s adverse effects,” at least where those effects would clearly 
be serious and disproportionate.”95 For its part, the majority specifically referred 
to the cases establishing the principle and worked to distinguish them from the 
case at hand: “None of the sections of the CAA in which the District of Columbia 
Circuit has found authority for the EPA to consider costs shares [this provision’s] 
prominence in the overall statutory scheme.”96 Thus the Court was at pains to 
cite, with apparent approval, the key cases creating the basic principle, and 
appeared to be saying that the EPA might well be permitted to consider costs if 
the statute did not expressly forbid it from doing so.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
to look a lot better; hence the best defenses of formalism are pragmatic in character. For the best 
discussion, see Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, NYU L Rev (2000); in the same spirit, see 
Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, U Chi L Rev (1999). 
93 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678-79 (DC Cir 2000). 
94 121 S Ct at 921. 
95 Id.  
96 121 S Ct at 910 n. 1.  
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On the other hand, Justice Breyer was clearly concerned that the Court’s 
approach would override the cost-benefit default principle.97 Justice Breyer urges 
that "In order better to achieve regulatory goals—for example, to allocate 
resources so that they save more lives or produce a cleaner environment—
regulators must often take account of all of a proposed regulation's adverse 
effects, at least where those effects clearly threaten serious and disproportionate 
public harm. Hence, I believe that, other things being equal, we should read 
silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory statutes as permitting, not 
forbidding, this type of rational regulation."98  This point was meant as a 
rejoinder to the majority, which Justice Breyer took to be saying that to allow 
costs to be considered, Congress was required to be “clear.” But at first glance, 
Justice Breyer’s concern seems baseless. The Court was saying only that in view 
of the clarity of the main provision of the Clean Air Act, judges would be 
reluctant to find permission to consider costs elsewhere, since Congress “does 
not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or 
ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouse-
holes.”99 This is a standard approach to statutory interpretation. It does not 
suggest that where a statute’s “fundamental details” are vague, they will be 
interpreted to forbid consideration of cost. 
 
But it would not be impossible to read the Court's opinion a bit more broadly. 
Recall that in concluding  that EPA need not consider costs in issuing national 
standards, the Court emphasized that some provisions of the CAA explicitly 
refer to costs, and explicitly require them to be taken into account. Here the 
Court was using the canon of construction, “expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius”: the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. In the particular 
context of environmental statutes, the “expressio unius” canon could have 
explosive implications. When Congress does not explicitly refer to costs, agencies 
may not consider them, and for one simple reason: Congress often does explicitly 
refer to costs. If the canon is to govern the future, the cost-benefit default 
principles are in some trouble. 
 
There is a further point. The Court seems to suggest that a statute should 
not be taken to confer broad discretionary authority on agencies: “We find it 
implausible that Congress would give to the EPA through these modest words 
the power to determine whether implementation costs should moderate national 
                                                 
97 121 S. Ct. at 921. 
98 Id. at 910 
99 Id.   
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air quality standards.”100 To support the view that ATA is best taken to disallow 
agencies to interpret ambiguous statutes to allow consideration of costs, it would 
be necessary to make a simple, two-step argument. First: Statutes should be 
construed so as to give agencies less rather than more in the way of discretion. 
Second:  A construction of a statute that would allow agencies to decide whether 
to consider costs significantly increases agency discretion. Now the claim here is 
not that a statute requiring cost-benefit analysis is itself disfavored on delegation 
grounds. The claim is instead that an interpretation should be disfavored if the 
consequence of the interpretation would be to authorize the agency to decide 
whether to engage in cost-benefit balancing. If this claim is accepted, then the 
default rule in favor of allowing agencies to consider costs stands as repudiated.  
 
But it is most unlikely that the Court would accept these lines of argument. 
The “expressio unius” canon can be a useful guide to statutory construction, and 
the more natural, cost-blind reading of “public health” is certainly supported by 
the fact that some provisions of the CAA make explicit reference to costs. But 
here as elsewhere, the “expressio unius” idea should be taken with many grains 
of salt. If Congress has not, under some ambiguous statutory term, referred to 
costs, it will often be because Congress, as an institution, has not resolved the 
question whether costs should be considered. And if this is so, the agency is 
entitled to consider costs if it chooses.101 The fact that Congress explicitly refers to 
costs under other provisions is not a good indication that, under an ambiguous 
text, costs are statutorily irrelevant.  This would be an extravagant and therefore 
implausible inference. The use of the “expressio unius” approach in ATA is best 
taken as a sensible way of fortifying the most natural interpretation, and not at 
all as a way of urging that explicit references to cost, in some provisions, means 
that costs may not be considered under ambiguous provisions. 
 
What about concerns about agency discretion? Agencies are typically 
allowed to interpret statutory ambiguities,102 and in countless cases in which that 
principle is invoked, the agency exercises a great deal of discretion over basic 
issues of policy and principle.103 To allow an agency to decide to consider costs is 
not to allow it to exercise more discretion than it does in numerous cases. Where 
the statute is unclear, agencies should be authorized to seek “rational 
regulation”; and nothing in ATA suggests otherwise. This is especially so in light 
                                                 
100 Id.  
101 See Chevron v. NRDC, 47 US 837 (1984); see also note supra. 
102 See Chevron v. NRDC, 47 US 837 (1984).. 
103 See, e.g., id.; Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, 515 US 687 (1995); Young v. Community 
Nutrition Institute, 476 US 974 (1986)  
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of the fact, emphasized by both the Court104 and Justice Breyer,105 that the Clean 
Air Act allows EPA to consider costs at numerous stages in the implementation 
process. I conclude that ATA is best taken not to question the cost-benefit default 
principle, and indeed that the most reasonable reading of the opinion is that the 
Court has explicitly embraced that principle. 
 
B. Nondelegation Again? Nondelegation Ever? 
 
The Court’s nondelegation ruling seems to be a kind of return to normalcy 
—as an effort to place the doctrine where it has been since 1935: In the 
constitutional coffin. This is a reasonable reading of the opinion, with the proviso 
that the doctrine remains available, now as before, for the extreme cases. What 
makes a case extreme? Apparently an extreme case would be one in which the 
agency has far more discretion than does the EPA under the “requisite to protect 
the public health” language. Cases of that sort are, by the logic of the Court’s 
opinion, very few and far between. Schechter Poultry106 remains good law, and the 
Court was careful to say that when the area of agency authority is very broad,  
the statutory principle will certainly have to be intelligible.  But the Court’s basic 
message was that its own precedents suggest that almost all nondelegation 
challenges will be unavailing—and indeed that a mere repetition of any statutory 
standard will be a sufficient response. 
 
1.  An unusual line of cases. In one sense, however, the Court’s 
nondelegation ruling was no mere a return to normalcy, and for a simple reason: 
It places some longstanding doctrine in disarray. In a series of cases, of which 
ATA was the culmination, the court of appeals for the District of Columbia circuit 
has held that a narrowing construction by an agency will be a sufficient and necessary 
condition for saving an otherwise objectionable delegation of authority.107 The doctrine 
originated in a challenge to the statute granting the President the authority to fix 
prices and wages.108 The relevant provisions appeared not to limit the President’s 
discretion – to allow the President to set prices and wages however he chooses. 
In upholding the statute against constitutional attack, the court said not only that 
Congress had set out an intelligible principle, but also that the executive was 
                                                 
104 121 S Ct at 910. 
105 121 S. Ct. at 921. 
106 ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. US, 295 US 495 (1935). 
107 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F Supp 737 (DDC 1971); International Union, 
UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (DC Cir 1991); International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F3d 605 
(DC Cir 1994). 
108 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (DDC 1971).  
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obliged to come up with “subsidiary” principles to cabin its own discretion. This 
part of the Court’s opinion owed its origins to some imaginative writing from 
Kenneth Culp Davis.109 The requirement of “subsidiary” principles seemed 
important to the decision, but it need not be seen as indispensable to it. It would 
be possible to read the relevant statute, in its context, as sharply limiting 
executive discretion, and thus to uphold it without relying at all on the need for a 
narrowing construction by the agency.110 
 
But the basic idea was significantly extended in an important case 
involving the Occupational Safety and Health Act.111 The relevant provision 
authorized the agency to set standards “reasonably necessary or appropriate” to 
provide safe and healthful places of employment.112 But what does this mean? Is 
this an open-ended delegation of authority? Would it be sufficient to say that the 
statute told the agency to do no more, and no less, than was “reasonably 
necessary or appropriate”? The court of appeals did not think that that would be 
sufficient. It was concerned that the statutory terms could mean any number of 
things. It could mean, for example, that OSHA should engage in cost-benefit 
analysis; perhaps a standard is not “reasonably necessary or appropriate” unless 
the benefits justified the costs. Or it could mean that OSHA was supposed to 
regulate all “significant risks” to a maximally protective point, subject perhaps to 
a constraint that the regulation be “feasible” for industry. Or it could mean 
something else. Because of the statutory term’s apparent plasticity, the court was 
obviously tempted to strike down the statute on nondelegation grounds. But 
instead of doing so, the court remanded the case to OSHA, concluding that the 
agency could save the statute with a narrowing construction. On remand, the 
agency generated what the court found—barely—to be a sufficient response.113 
According to the agency, the statute required it to regulate only “significant 
risks,” and only to the point of “feasibility,” and within those constraints the 
agency was required to select the standard that would be most protective of 
workers. The court said that this was enough to satisfy the constitutional 
concern. 
 
                                                 
109 See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U Chi L. Rev 713 (1969). 
110 In brief: The wage and price freeze was a response to the perception that the nation was in the 
midst of “cost-;push” inflation. That was the statutory background. If that is what the statute was 
about, then the President could not play favorites, or reward his friends and punish his enemies. I 
say a bit more on this issue below. 
111 International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 928 F2d 1310 (DC Cir 1991). 
112 29 USC 652 (8) 
113 International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F3d 605 (DC Cir 1994).  
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Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s ruling in ATA, the approach of the 
court of appeals is not impossible to understand. If we are concerned about an 
absence of accountability, and also about values associated with the rule of law, a 
narrowing construction at the agency level can do a great deal of importance. 
Such a construction can expose the agency’s standard to public oversight and 
review; it increases transparency and to that extent accountability. And by 
ensuring that agency action will be undertaken pursuant to a clear standard, a 
narrow construction can go a long way toward alleviating the concern of 
arbitrary, unpredictable agency action, treating the similarly situated differently. 
But we should be careful not to say that the purposes of the nondelegation are 
the doctrine itself, or to dissociate the doctrine from Article I, its legal source. At 
most, a narrowing construction can be helpful when the Court is otherwise in 
equipoise. The nondelegation concern is not eliminated by such a construction. 
 
This is basically the Court’s response in ATA.114 And it is evident that after 
ATA, the court of appeals’ approach is entirely unacceptable. The Supreme Court 
has made clear that a narrowing interpretation by the agency cannot save an 
otherwise objectionable delegation.  And in the end the Court’s reasoning makes 
perfect sense. If the problem is that Congress has failed to lay down standards 
for agencies to follow, how can the agency’s own standards resolve that 
problem? The question seems all the harder to answer in light of the fact that the 
source of the nondelegation doctrine is Article I, section 1, which vests legislature 
power in a “Congress of the United States.” The purpose of the nondelegation 
doctrine, it would seem, is to require Congress to legislate. Agency narrowing is 
neither here nor there. 
 
2. The line revisited—and OSHA’s fate. How, then, should the now-rejected 
court of appeals decisions  be understood? Might the Court have (inadvertently?) 
given a new boost to the nondelegation doctrine, by suggesting that a narrowing 
construction cannot be helpful? These questions are not simple to answer. The 
case of freezing wages and prices is the easier to handle. To be sure, Congress 
did not give clear standards in the text of the statute. But statutory terms receive 
meaning from context, and the context behind the Act suggested a desire to 
protect the nation from a certain kind of inflationary pressure, captured in the 
notion of “cost-push inflation,” in accordance of which unions and employers 
create a kind of psychological spiral, one that needs to be broken through law.115  
                                                 
114 See 121 S. Ct. at 111. 
115 See Stephen Breyer and Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 80-83 
(2d ed. 1985).  
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The statute itself did not refer to this theory, but it is clear, from context, that 
Congress did not seek to give the President the authority to freeze prices and 
wages in a way that involved political favoritism. If the statute should be 
interpreted so as to avoid the constitutional difficulty, it would not be an 
intolerable stretch to say that any executive action should be reviewed with the 
particular context in mind—and hence that statutory purpose sharply limited 
presidential discretion. Perhaps it will be responded that Congress should be 
required to say all this clearly in the statutory text itself. But would much be 
gained by requiring this step? This is far from obvious. 
 
But the contested provision of OSHA is much harder. The phrase 
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” seems, on its face, to leave everything 
open. To be sure, the phrase might at first appear similar to the standard that the 
Court found sufficient in ATA. But there is a big difference. In ATA, the Court 
held, immediately before upholding the statute against nondelegation attack, 
that the statute required a “health only” determination, and that it did not allow 
consideration of costs.116 The ATA Court held the statute constitutional in part 
because Congress was clear on this point; Congress itself decided  that costs 
would not count, and the agency was not permitted to create the legal standard 
out of thin air. It seems to follow that if a statute itself requires consideration of 
costs, and hence a form of cost-benefit balancing, it would also be constitutional, 
notwithstanding the high levels of residual discretion that would remain. What 
makes the relevant provision of OSHA much harder is that it seems to give the 
agency discretion to decide whether the statute does or does not allow 
consideration of costs, and thus to decide what the statutory standard is. This 
was Chief Justice Rehnquist’s objection to another provision of OSHA117—an 
objection that was rejected on the ground that that provision could be 
authoritatively construed sharply to discipline the agency’s discretion.118 
 
Nothing in ATA, in short, resolves the question whether a court should 
uphold a statute that leaves the agency the authority to constructs its most 
fundamental meaning. Now it is important to be careful with this point. As we 
have seen, lower courts have created an interpretive principle authorizing 
agencies to consider costs if they see fit, and ATA seems to approve of this 
                                                 
116 121 S. Ct. at 109-110. 
117 See Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. API, 448 US 607, 624 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
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principle.119 It would be implausible to suggest that a statute is unconstitutional if 
it allows an agency to decide whether or not to consider costs; this kind of 
decision has been found acceptable in many contexts, and ATA cannot be taken 
to say that the underlying statutes are now unconstitutional. After ATA, the 
appropriate answer to the constitutional question is this: Statutes that allow 
agencies to decide whether to consider costs admittedly confer considerable 
discretion. But after ATA, this is the further thing from fatal. The rest of the 
relevant statutes typically contains real limits on agency discretion. Even if 
agencies are allowed to decide whether or not to consider costs, they do not, 
under those statutes, have anything like a blank check. 
 
But OSHA’s “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language seems quite 
different on this count. In the abstract, that language allows the agency to choose 
the statutory standard. The significance of ATA is that if this conclusion is to be 
avoided, it cannot be for the reason invoked by the court of appeals. It must be 
because the statute is best construed to cabin agency discretion to some degree. 
We know, for example, that the statute bars measures that are unreasonable, or 
inappropriate, as means of achieving safe work places. In this way the statute can 
be taken to require cost-effectiveness, and also to require the agency to pursue 
the end of worker safety. But is this enough? The end of worker safety can be 
pursued in multiple ways. To be sure, the constitutional doubt would be 
removed, under ATA, if the statute were construed to require cost-benefit 
balancing.120  We can easily imagine a judicial opinion that would so construe the 
statute; perhaps a step is “reasonably necessary or appropriate” if and only if it 
survives balancing, all things considered. But the court of appeals was probably 
right to say that this interpretation, while possible, is not ordained by the 
statutory text. And it is because the interpretation is not ordained that the court 
remanded the case to the EPA for an authoritative construction. The problem, 
after ATA, is that such a construction is, with respect to the nondelegation issue, 
neither here nor there. 
 
In these circumstances, future courts have only three options. The first 
would be a version of the route taken in ATA:  to point to other statutes giving 
agencies broad discretion (such as the “public interest, convenience, and 
necessity” standard of the Federal Communications Commission) and to urge 
                                                 
119 See below. 
120 I have suggested above that a cost-benefit standard by itself leaves agencies a great deal of 
discretion, especially in the valuation of benefits. But under ATA, this degree of discretion, which 
is in fact quite standard, cannot possibly be taken to raise a serious constitutional problem.  
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that the disputed provision is not much different. The problem with this 
approach is that it would be somewhat irresponsible without some effort to show 
how the agency is not permitted to do whatever it chooses. The second would be 
to generate an interpretation of the provision that adequately cabins agency 
discretion. This would certainly be possible, but the strategy in ATA—merely 
repeating the statutory language, with the added words “no less and no more”—
would not be helpful. The third would be to strike down the statute on 
nondelegation grounds. It is ironic but true that this route may have been made 
more rather than less likely as a result of the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
approach of the court of appeals. 
 
Should the court take this step? In general, I think that the ATA Court was 
entirely correct to suggest that the nondelegation doctrine deserve little place in 
modern constitutional law. For this reason, some combination of the first and 
second routes might be best: An effort to construe the statute to impose some 
limitations, with a recognition that a great deal of discretion is constitutionally 
legitimate. But if the nondelegation doctrine deserves any place at all, the 
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” language, in context, would not be the 
worst place for judicial invalidation.  
 
C. The Future of National Standards  
(with special reference to particulates and ozone) 
 
 After  ATA, a major question is how a plaintiff might be able to challenge a 
national standard, if costs cannot be considered and if the constitutional route is 
unavailable. ATA offers little guidance here. If the regulation is less stringent 
than is “requisite to protect the public health,” with an “adequate margin of 
safety,” it will be unlawful. If the regulation is more stringent than is requisite, it 
will also be unlawful. In the easy cases, the lessons are clear. A regulation will be 
subject to challenge if it allows significant adverse health effects, at least if the 
agency cannot reasonably explain that the adverse effects are insignificant.  If we 
accept the evidence described above, it would therefore be reasonable to argue 
that the EPA was required, and not merely permitted, to produce a new 
regulation for particulates. A regulation will also be subject to challenge if 
significant adverse effects cannot be expected at levels that the EPA forbids. On a 
reasonable reading of the evidence governing ozone, the new EPA regulation is 
unlawful for that reason.  
 
I will return to these issues below. There are three major possibilities, and 
each of them would be entirely reasonable. In the end I will urge that the  
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particulates rule should probably be upheld, but that the ozone standard should 
probably be remanded, so that the EPA can give a better, more quantitative 
explanation of why it chose the particular regulatory "points" that it selected. 
This judgment is tentative. What is more important than the conclusion is an 
appreciation of the grounds on which the three possibilities might be criticized 
and defended. 
 
 1.  A soft look. The court might say that there is substantial scientific 
evidence to support the view that both pollutants produce significant adverse 
health effects at currently permitted levels -- and hence the new controls are, in 
the administrator’s reasonable judgment, “requisite to protect the public health.” 
The statutory requirement of an “adequate margin of safety” might well be taken 
to support this view. As I have emphasized, the evidence supporting regulation 
of ozone seems a good deal weaker than the evidence supporting regulation of 
ozone, especially if we take into account the fact that ground-level ozone seems 
to have nontrivial health benefits. But perhaps a court should say that there is 
much scientific uncertainty here, and that the EPA should be allowed to resolve 
the doubts as it sees fit. If the court took this route, it would be following the 
direction established in the Lead Industries case, in which the EPA was given a 
great deal of room to maneuver.121 
 
  There are several advantages to this approach, especially if we consider 
the institutional role of the courts. A serious problem with intense judicial review 
of agency action is that it creates delay—and hence ensures a bias in favor of the 
status quo.122 It is exceptionally easy for a skillful adequate to challenge a 
national standard as either too high or too low. On the basis of EPA’s own data, 
an environmental group would have had a quite plausible argument that the 
regulation of particulates was insufficiently stringent under the statute. In order 
to allow agencies room to maneuver in the face of scientific uncertainty, it would 
be reasonable to say that on the basis of minimally plausible evidence, courts 
should simply uphold the relevant decisions. It is a special virtue of this 
approach that the Bush Administration would be permitted to come to a 
different conclusion from the Clinton Administration, and vice-versa, because 
different judgments of value could lead to different conclusions about how to 
proceed in the face of ambiguous science. 
 
                                                 
121 See Lead Industries Association v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980). 
122 See Jerry Mashaw and David Harsft, The Struggle for Auto Safety (1993).  
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 2.  Evidentiary review. A second possibility, hinted at above, would be to 
invalidate the ozone regulation while upholding the regulation of particulates. 
The simple claim here would be that on the evidence given, the new particulates 
standard was requisite to protect the public health – but the new ozone standard 
was not, especially if we take into account the health benefits of ground-level 
ozone.123 We have seen the possibility that all things considered, the regulation 
would increase rather than reduce, health problems.  
 
Even if this is overstated, Justice Breyer’s opinion rightly suggests that the 
EPA is not supposed to remove all risks from the air, or to make the air “risk-
free,” and that the EPA should take account of context to compare the risk at 
hand to risks that people face in ordinary life. It does appear that the statistical 
risks from low levels of ozone are smaller than the statistical risks that people 
find acceptable in multiple domains. Particulates are very different on this count. 
Here the existing hazards do seem high, on  a plausible reading of the evidence. 
By upholding the particulates standard, and asking the EPA to explain itself 
more thoroughly with respect to ozone, the court would be contributing to the 
development of a kind of common law of acceptable risks, of the sort that Justice 
Breyer seemed to be encouraging. 
 
  The approach I am suggesting—upholding the particulates standard as 
requisite, while invalidating the ozone standard as not requisite—would 
certainly be reasonable. The principal objection would be institutional; it would 
involve the special limitations of judicial  review. The evidence shows the 
possibility of nontrivial health gains from the ozone regulation, and in the face of 
scientific uncertainty, the agency should be permitted to make whatever 
(reasonable) policy choices it likes. Especially in view of the risk of status quo 
bias, perhaps the court should refuse to invalidate a judgment like that in the 
ozone case, even if the judgment seems wrong. 
 
 3.  Requiring a clear standard. A third possibility would be to invalidate both 
regulations as arbitrary or as inadequately justified, not because the risks are too 
low, but because EPA did not explain on what grounds it chose these particular 
regulations, rather than regulations that would be somewhat more strict or 
somewhat more lenient. This would be the administrative law analogue of what 
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suggesting how a reviewing court might reasonably respond to the data that the EPA has 
compiled.  
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Judge Williams took to be a constitutional requirement in ATA.124 The Supreme 
Court’s holding that the nondelegation doctrine does not require this form of 
specificity says nothing about whether such specificity might be required as a 
matter of administrative law. If the EPA cannot explain, in concrete terms, why it 
chose the particular levels it chose, how can courts know that the agency’s 
decision was not arbitrary? 
 
  In doctrinal terms, judicial invalidation on these grounds might take one 
of two routes. First, the court might say that it cannot know whether the 
particular level chosen is “requisite to protect the public health” unless it has a 
clear sense of why the EPA reached that conclusion. Without numbers and 
criteria, it is impossible to obtain any such sense. Second, the court might say that 
it cannot tell whether the agency’s action is arbitrary or capricious, within the 
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act,125 unless the EPA has given a 
more detailed explanation of its choice. Either of these conclusions would be 
relatively conventional, and neither would mark a huge departure from current 
law.  
 
But there would be a genuine innovation here. Thus far, courts have not 
required anything like a quantitative basis for health and safety regulation. 
Sometimes they have required agencies to show that the costs are not grossly 
disproportionate to the benefits126; sometimes they have prohibited agencies from 
acting when it seems as if there are not benefits at all.127 But the relevant 
decisions have been more qualitative than quantitative, and when they have 
been quantitative, the overall judgment has seemed overwhelmingly clear.128 It 
would be a significant step from these decisions to a holding that agencies must 
quantify the effects of pollutants at various levels, so as to explain, in specific 
terms, why one level was chosen rather than another. 
 
Would the step be worthwhile? While I cannot discuss the issue in detail, I 
believe that it would be, at least for the ozone rule, where the evidence of harm is 
relatively thin. 129  Such a ruling would not impose an unacceptable informational 
burden on EPA. In fact EPA routinely gathers enough information to provide the 
necessary explanation. At the same time, such a requirement would provide a 
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127 See Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. EPA, 217 F.3d 861 (DC Cir 2000). 
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useful spur to theagency, one that would also produce a higher degree of 
rationality andcoherence. The result would be to show when, and why, 
environmental groupsor industry would be able to mount a successful challenge 
to an ambient airquality standard. 
 
In sum: I believe that on remand, the court should uphold the particulates 
standard, on the ground that on a reasonable view of the evidence, the agency 
had sufficient basis to conclude that that standard was “requisite to protect the 
public health,” even without an attempt to quantify. At the same time, the court 
should remand the ozone rule, on the ground that the EPA has not given an 
adequate explanation of why that rule is “requisite.” The court should encourage 
the EPA to be as quantitative as possible. And on remand, the EPA should take 
up the invitation, attempting in the process to give a clear sense, for the first 
time, of why it has chosen one regulatory “point” rather than another. But my 
principal goal has not been to urge any particular result, which will obviously 
turn on close engagement with the record. I have attempted instead to give a 
sense of the arguments that are available, post-ATA, and a general sense of the 
grounds on which one might choose among them. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court’s principal rulings in ATA represented a return to normalcy – a 
rejection of some imaginative suggestions about how to read both the Clean Air 
Act and the Constitution. The Court established, quite correctly under existing 
law, that national standards should be set without regard to cost, and that the 
nondelegation doctrine has a small place in constitutional doctrine – or perhaps 
no place at all. 
 
At the same time, the Court’s unambitious, lawyerly opinion leaves a 
number of questions unresolved. There is some ambiguity in the case, but the 
opinion is best taken not to question, but on the contrary to endorse, the cost-
benefit default principles developed by lower courts. And while the Court 
showed no interest in the nondelegation doctrine, its rejection of the approach of 
the lower court now makes it impossible to invoke an agency’s narrowing 
construction to support an otherwise objectionable delegation. For that reason, 
the nondelegation doctrine is not quite dead. I have attempted to show that the 
little life that remains in the nondelegation doctrine might well support a 
constitutional attack on the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 
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ATA also leaves open a number of challenges to national ambient air 
quality standards, including the very standards at issue in the case. The principal 
challenges would involve the language of the relevant provision of the CAA 
(“requisite”) and the arbitrary or capricious standard of the APA. On the basis of 
the evidence before the agency, it would make sense for a court to uphold the 
particulates standard as having been reasonably judged “requisite” while also 
invalidating the ozone standard as not shown to qualify as such. For the EPA 
itself, it would certainly make sense to move in the direction of greater 
quantification, in which national standards are issued only after an effort to 
specify the expected benefits, to compare them with the expected benefits of 
alternatives, and in that way to produce clear standards for choosing appropriate 
levels of ambient air quality. This is essentially an administrative task, not one 
for the courts. But it would be entirely appropriate for courts to spur regulatory 
agencies in this direction. Justice Breyer wrote only for himself, and his 
pragmatic, consequence-centered concurring opinion attracted no additional 
justices; but I believe that it will exert an enduring influence on the law of risk 
regulation. If so, the ATA decision will stand not only as a responsible resolution 
of the principal questions in the case, but also as a modest step toward a more 
sensible system of environmental protection. 
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